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or indirect, that the witness was in the employ of the defendant's
insurer. It is questionable whether such knowledge on the part of
the plaintiff is relevant to the issue of whether the fact of employment should be admitted as bearing on the witness credibility
before the jury.
There is one salient feature in Ellison which is not found in
Butcher. In Ellison, the trial judge failed to tender an instruction
which would have limited the jury's consideration of the disclosure of indemnity insurance to the sole purpose of determining
possible interest or bias of the witness employed by the defendant's
insurer. In Butcher, the court placed great stress upon the trial
court's instruction. However, since the Ellison opinion did not discuss the merits of that issue it is conceivable that a curative instruction would not have changed the outcome of the case.
In conclusion, the rule prohibiting any mention of insurance
at the trial continues to be followed in West Virginia. At the same
time various exceptions have been drawn which limit the rule to a
moderate extent. However, the strength of the Butcher exception
which permitted disclosure of insurance for the limited purpose
of showing the interest or bias of a witness appears to have been
weakened by the Ellison holding, which flatly denies approval to
such disclosure under the facts presented there. Therefore, the
state of the law on this point is somewhat in confusion and an
attorney would be well advised to study both decisions in detail
before endeavoring to reveal a witness' connection with an insurance company.
Craig R. McKay

Federal Courts-State Laws In Conflict With
Federal Procedural Rules
In 1945 the Supreme Court scuttled any hope that simplistic
divisions between procedure and substance would mark the distinction between the state law applied under the Erie doctrine and
the domain of the then new Federal rules of Civil Procedure. The
Court, that year decided Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,' the first

major decision dealing with a conflict between a Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure and a state substantive law.2 The federal courts
1326 U.S. 99 (1945).

:The earlier decision of Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941), did not
deal with an applicable federal rule in "direct collision" with a substantive
state law. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 US. 460, 471 n.13 (1965).
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are required by the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins3 to apply
state substantive law. The York Court, attempting to promate uniform results when state and federal courts consider similar questions of state law, held that state law should be applied in diversity actions where a different result would be reached if the federal rule were applied.
The York decision caused an uneasiness among federal practitioners that grew to apprehension just four years later. The
Court's 1949 decision in Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co.4 was interpreted as having applied a state statute in lieu
of an applicable Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. This created
widespread concern among federal practitioners. 5 The Ragan
decision was characterized as threatening to invalidate all the
federal rules." Although this concern was probably unwarranted,'
it remained prevalent until the Supreme Court decided Hanna v.
Plumer8 in 1965.
Hanna, like York and Ragan, perpetuates the apprehension
over the relationship between federal rules and state substantive
laws-but now the concern runs in a different direction.9 Hanna
seems to invite a disregard for state laws under the guise of promoting the internal purity and integrity of the federal procedural
rules. The invited disregard for state laws has arisen not so much
from the Court's holding in Hanna as it has from some of its
sweeping language. Specifically, the area of conflict in Hanna,
Ragan, and York involves the extent of the application in a diversity action of a federal rule conflicting with a state law reflecting
a substantive policy decision of a state, but which may not fit
neatly into any traditional substantive law category.
Hanna Defined
Hanna was a diversity action in which the plaintiff, a resident
of Ohio, filed a complaint in federal district court in Massachusetts
3 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

4337 U.S. 530 (1949).
5 Merrigan, Erie to York to Ragan-a Triple Play on the Federal Rules, 3
VAND. L. Rav. 711 (1950).
GQuigley, Congressional Repair of the Erie Derailment, 60 MiCH. L. REy.
1031 (1962); Keeffe, Gilhooley, Bailey & Day, Weary Erie, 34, CoRNELL L. Q. 494
(1949).
7The Advisory Committee which drafted Rule 3 involved in Ragan probably never intended that rule to toll state statutes of limitations. See 66 note
27 infra.
8 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
9 McCoid, Hanna v. Plumer: The Erie Doctrine Changes Shape, 51 VA. L.
Rv. 884 (1965).
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against the executor of a deceased Massachusetts resident. The
defendant executor was served with process in conformity with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 (d) (1) by leaving a copy of the summons with his wife at his residence.20 The defendant allowed the
period for the statute of limitations to pass, and then he moved
the district court to enter summary judgment on the ground that
the substituted personal service authorized by Federal Rule 4 (d)
(1) had not tolled the running of the state statute of limitation.
The defendant's argument was founded on a special Massachusetts
statute regulating actions against executors which seemingly
required "in hand" service or notice filed in the registry of
probate to toll the statute of limitation." Both the federal district
court and the circuit court of appeals, 2 after reviewing the Massachusetts decisions, found the Massachusetts statute to be "substantive" state law and thus controlling under the doctrine of
Erie R. R. v. Tompkins. On appeal the Supreme Court reversed, 3
ruling that the action had been timely commenced, and that the
substituted personal service authorized by the federal rule dictated
the type of service required.
The Purpose of the Hanna Doctrine
To appreciate the complexities involved in Hanna,it is necessary to distinguish between the holding in Hanna and the doctrine
of Hanna. The holding was seemingly narrow and predictable. 14 As
Professor Wright stated: "The precise holding of that case was
that substituted service on an executor by leaving process at his
usual place of abode, as authorized by Rule 4 (d) (1), is sufficient
even where a state statute requires in hand service on an executor
within a specified period."' 5 Despite its narrow holding Professor
McCoid has suggested that Hanna may be broadly interpreted to
espouse the doctrine "that state substantive purpose embodied in a
10 FED.

R. Crv. P. 4 (d) provides in part: "Service shall be made as follows:

(1) Upon an individual other than an infant or an incompetent person,

by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to him personnally

or by leaving copies thereof at his dwelling house or usual place of abode
with some person of suitable age ..
"
"3See text accompanying note 45 infra.
12 Hanna v. Plumer, 881 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1964).
'3 Hanna v. Plumer 880 U.S. 460 (1965), reg 381F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1954).
'4 78 HAutv. L. Ray. 673 (1965). Of the circuit court's decision the
commentator stated: "IRjecognizing the importance of procedural certainty.
the best approach would have been to place a heavy burden on the party seeking to subordinate a federal rule to a conflicting state procedure. Under this
approach, the present case seems incorrectly decided. Id. at 676 (footnote omitted) .
Irl C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 55, at 227-28 (2d ed. 1970).
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procedural rule cannot be given effect when the procedural directive conflicts with one of the federal rules."'1 If this is a proper statement of the Hanna doctrine, it is obvious that the difficult question of what is substantive law and what is procedural
law becomes of primary importance.
The initial problem of the characterization of substance and
procedure in diversity cases, raised in Hanna, was not created by
the adoption of the federal rules but by the noted decision of Erie
R. R. v. Tompkins.'7 Basically, the so-called "Erie doctrine"118 is
that in federal diversity actions, "[elxcept in matters governed by
the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State.' 9 Erie has subsequently
been interpreted as requiring federal courts in diversity actions to
apply state substantive law and federal procedural law.20 The principal justification for the Erie holding was to curtail the widespread forum shopping" which had developed as an outgrowth
of the Court's earlier decision in Swift v. Tyson. 2 Justice Brandeis
in Erie indicated that requiring federal courts sitting in diversity
actions to apply the law of the forum state would decrease the inequitable administration of the law.2 3 Concern for the federal
courts' policy of promoting uniformity of result between state
courts and federal courts in diversity actions dominated opinions
in federal diversity actions for a time.24
The Hanna Court not only recognized that the Erie doctrine
commanded federal courts to apply state substantive law and
federal procedural law, but also recognized that this command was
identical to that of the Federal Rules Enabling Act. 2 However,
the Court was prompt to point out that although the mandate of
the federal act and the Erie rule were identical, it did not necessarily follow that identical tests would be used to distinguish sub16 McCoid, Hanna v. Plumer: The Erie Doctrine Changes Shape, 51 VA. L.
REV.

884, 890 n.26 (1965).

17304 US. 64
1S

C.

WRIGHT,

(1938).
FEDERAL CouRTs § 55, at 228 (2d ed. 1970). "Lawyers com-

monly refer to 'the Erie doctrine,' and this practice will be followed in the
present work. It is dear, however, that the doctrine today is not what was
announced in 1938." Id.
19 Erie R.R. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).

20 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965); Sampson v. Channell, 110
F.2d 754 (Ist Cir. 1940) cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1939).
21 304 U.S. 64, 73 (1938).
223 04 U.S. 1 (16 Pet.) (1842).

23304 U.S. 64, 75

(1938).

V4See, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
25 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965).
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stantive law from procedural law.26 It must be recalled that since
Erie was decided prior to the promulgation of the federal rules,
the Erie opinion did not consider what effect the federal rules
would have in determining whether a law was substantive or pro-

cedural. 27 The limited choice in the Erie case was between state
substantive law and a federal procedure which at that time was of
subordinate interest to the federal judiciary. 28 Consequently, the
Court in Hanna saw the seemingly simple choice presented by
Erie complicated by the addition of a uniform system of federal
procedure. Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority, indicated in two key passages the impact the federal rules had on
Erie-type situations:

When a situation is covered by one of the Federal
Rules, the queston facing the court is a far cry from the
typical, relatively unguided Erie choice: the court has
been instructed to apply the Federal Rule, and can refuse
to do so only if the Advisory Committee, this Court, and
Congress erred in their prima facie judgment that the
Rule in question transgresses neither the terms
of the Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions. 29
The Chief Justice went on to point out:
Erie and its offspring cast no doubt on the long-recognized power of Congress to prescribe housekeeping rules
for federal courts even though some of those rules will
inevitably differ from comparable state rules.3 0
Implicit in the language of the Chief Justice quoted above is
a disregard of the policy of federal-state uniformity which since
Erie had been a primary consideration in federal diversity actions.81
The Court appears to value uniform interpretation of the federal
261d. at 469-70.

27 See note 4 to Rule 3 of the April 1937 Draft made by the
Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules found in 2 J. Moore, Federal Practice 113.07 n.3 (2d ed. 1970). Note 4 to Rule 3 provided in part: "When a federal or state statute of limitations is pleaded as a defense, a question may arise
under this rule whether the mere filing of the complaint stops the running
of the statute or whether any further step is required, such as service of the
summons and complaint or their delivery to the marshall for service." Id.
26 The Conformity Act of 1872, Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat.
197, required the federal courts to look to the state procedure in law actions.
The act provided in part that "the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of
proceeding in civil causes, other than, equity and admiralty causes, in the
district courts, shall conform, as near as may be, to the practice, pleadings,
and forms and modes of proceeding existing at the time in like causes in the
courts of record of the State within which such district courts are held...
29 380 U.S. at 471 (footnote omitted).
so ld. at 473.
21 See, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 US. 99 (1945).
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rules in federal courts above uniformity between state and federal
forums in diversity actions. 32 The Hanna opinion fails to acknow-

ledge the delicate balance between the state and federal systems"5
that has been noted in the other cases.3 4 In the wake of Hanna
federal courts are confronted with the problem of determining
how far to go in disregarding state laws in following the Court's
guideline of adherence to their own housekeeping rules. 5
The Scope of the Hanna Doctrine
Federal practitioners face a difficult task in attempting to ascertain the limits of the Hanna doctrine. The statement in Hanna
that Congress has power "to prescribe housekeeping rules for the
federal courts even though some of those rules will inevitably differ
from comparable state rules,"3 s coupled with the Court's interest
in promoting uniform procedure among the federal courts7 may
indicate that the Court will now give first priority to uniform
federal procedure. Although Hanna can be viewed as a victory for
the federal rules, caution should be exercised not to interpret
Hanna as permitting the abridgment of state substantive law by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,-such an interpretation is
something Congress expressingly did not intend 8 and the Constitution may not permit. 39 Justification for a narrow interpretation of
32
In Hanna the Chief Justice quoting from a Fifth Circuit decision
states: "One of the shaping purposes of the Federal Rules is to bring about
uniformity in the federal courts by getting away from local rules." 380 U.S. at
473, quoting from Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., v. Wright, 322 F.2d 759, 764
(5th Cir. 1963).
33 However, in his concurring opinion Mr. Justice Harlan declared: "I think
the Court has misconceived the constitutional premises of Erie . . . . I have
always regarded that decision as one of the modern cornerstones of our federalism, expressing policies that profoundly touch the allocation of judicial power
between the state and federal systems." "380 U.S. at 474.
34 See, e.g., United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966); Henry v. Mississ-

ippi,35379 U.S. 443 (1965); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
See generally McCoid, Hanna v. Plumer: The Erie Doctrine Changes
Shape, 51 VA. L. REv. 884 (1965); Note, Choice of Procedure in Diversity Cases, 75 YALE L. J. 477 (1966).
86 380 US. at 473.
3
7See note 32, supra.
8828 US.C. § 2072 (1948), (Rules Enabling Act) provides, in pertinent
part: "The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe, by general rules,
the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure of the district courts of the United States In civil actions.
Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right ...
39 Few legal issues have created as much division among scholarly writers
as the question of the constitutional basis of the Erie doctrine. Most earlier
commentators were critical of any constitutional foundation for the Erie doctrine; however, more recent commentators have defended the constitutional
basis of Erie. See generally, Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53
Nw. U.L Rav. 427 (1958); Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And the New Federal
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the Hanna doctrine can be found in the Court's persistent use.of
restrictive language in Hanna and its refusal to expressly overturn
Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co.40
Ragan was the principal case on which the lower federal
courts in Hanna had relied in concluding the Massachusetts requirements of "in hand service" to be substantive state law, and
thus controlling under the Erie doctrine. In his concurring opinion in Hanna, Justice Harlan stated that if Ragan was still good
law, (and the Court's opinion seems to indicate that it is), then
the lower federal courts' rulings on the facts in Hanna should be
affirmed.41 However, Justice Harlan pointed out that he could
concur in the final disposition of Hanna since he believed Ragan
had been incorrectly decided.42 Undoubtedly there is difficulty in
reconciling Hanna with Ragan, but if a reconciliation can be made
as the majority implied, then perhaps the limits of the Hanna
doctrine will be clarified, and the proper approach to cases involving conflicts between state law and the federal rules can be ascertained.
Ragan Distinguished
Ragan, a diversity action, involved a Kansas statute of limitation which provides "[a] n action shall be deemed commenced...
as to each defendant, at the date of the summons which is served
on him.. . ."43 However, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 provides
that "[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the
court." The facts were such that the applicable statute of limitation ended on a date after the filing of the complaint but before
service had been made on the defendant. The question in Ragan
was whether the running of the statute of limitation had been
tolled by mere filing in accordance with the federal rule although
the state statute of limitation declared that actions were not commenced until the summons had been served. The Supreme Court
ruled that the state statute of limitation had not been tolled by
filing in compliance with the federal rule. The Ragan Court viewed the period of the statute of limitation as a matter of state sub-

Common Law, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (1964). Chief Justice Warren has given

new vitality to the constitutional underpinnings of the Erie doctrine. 880 U.S.
at 471-72.
40 837 US. 530 (1949).
41 880 U.S. at 476.
42 Id. at 477.
43 337 U.S. 530, 531 (1949). Kansas has subsequently adopted new rules of
civil procedure. See also, KAN. GEN. STAT. AN. § 60-510 (1964).
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stantive law which, under the rule of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, could
not be varied by a federal rule of procedure.
Despite the seeming inconsistency between Ragan and Hanna,
Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court in Hanna, found a dis.
tinguishing factor between the two cases. The Chief Justice was
4
able to divide the applicable Massachusetts statute into two parts."
The statute provides in part:
Except as provided in this chapter, an executor or
administrator shall not be held to answer to an action by
a creditor of the deceased which is not commenced within
one year from the time of his giving bond for the performance of his trust, or to such an action which is commenced within said year unless before the expiration thereof the writ in such action has been served by delivery in
hand upon such executor or administrator.. . .4 (Italics
added to indicate the Court's separation of the statute
into two parts.)
The first part of the Massachusetts statute was read as a stature
of limitation since it deals with commencement of actions. The
Court however, viewed this part of the statute, though assuming
it to be substantive law, as being compiled with by timely "commencement" of the action upon filing of the complaint. While the
statute of limitation in Ragan was worded to make the statutory
limitation provision inseparable from an action's commencement
by service, the wording of the statute of limitation in Hanna did
not specify the method of starting the action. Thus, the Court
apparently felt free to hold that the action had been timely commenced by filing.
The second part of the Massachusetts statute, however, was
not interpreted as dealing with "commencement" of an action as
that term is used when referring to a method which tolls a statute
of limitation. Rather, it was viewed as dealing solely with a procedural matter-the mode of service of process-the purpose of which
was "to insure that executors will receive actual notice of claims."
It is this second part of the Massachusetts' statute regarding the
method of service that the Court in Hanna declared inconsistant
with the federal rule, not the first part containing the statute of
44

580 U.S. at 462 n.1. This footnote provides in part: "Section 9 is in part

a statute of limitations ....This part of the statute ...
this case....

is not involved in

"Section 9 also provides for the manner of service... . The purpose of this
part of the statute is involved here. .. " (emphasis by the Court).
45 Id. at 462.
46 Id. at 465 nal.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol73/iss3/9
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limitations provision. It would appear that the rule of Ragan dedaring a state statute of limitation to be substantive when the time
period and the method of commencing the action are inseparable,
continues in force.
By not overruling Ragan, Hanna seems to declare that when
the method of starting an action is made an inseparable part of a
statute of limitation, Federal Rule 4 (d) cannot infringe upon the
state's substantive statute of limitations; therefore, the state's
method of commencement governs, not because the state can dictate
how an action is begun in the federal courts, but because the
state's method of commencement may be made a part of the state's
substantive law which is not to be altered, abridged, or modified
by any federal rule.4 7 On the other hand, where commencement of
an action is separable from a state statute of limitations, commenceent in federal diversity actions is governed by Federal Rule 4 (d)
although the running and tolling of such a statute may be governed by state law.
Hanna's Cautions Language
Not all the potential for defining the limits of the Hanna doctrine lies in the distinction the Court found between the respective
statutes involved in Hanna and Ragan. How far the Court will go
in displacing state law with federal procedure in order to promote
federal rule uniformity should to a large extent depend upon the
nature, language, and purpose of both the state law and the particular federal rule, as well as the degree of conflict between the
two.
Although the Court recognized that Erie-type problems were
not to be solved by reference to any traditional or common-sense
substance-procedure distinction, 48 there is an indication in the
Court's opinion that such a substance-procedure distinction will be
one of the first tests applied when examining Hanna-type problems.
Such a cursory determination of the nature of the different laws
involved is indicated by the Court's observation that the federal
rules are prima facie procedural. 49 To declare that a Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure is prime facie procedural is certainly based on a
common sense observation. On the other hand, a cursory examination of the conflicting state law will probably not so readily reveal
47 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1953). The pertinent part of this statute is set out in
note 38, supra.
48380 U.S. at 465-66.
49 See text accompanying note 29 suPra.
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a prima facie characterization. Perhaps the best one can settle for
on initial observation is that if the state law conflicts with the federal rule a further examination of the scope and purpose of both
the federal rule and the state law is necessary. It must be emphasized that once a conflict is established a further examination
must then be conducted. A failure to make such an examination
would imply that the mere presence of a federal rule determines its
application.
Once a conflict between a state law and a federal rule is presented, in order for the question of displacement of the state law
to arise, there must be a direct conflict between the laws of the
two sovereigns.5 0 In Hanna the Court noted that the clash involved
was "unavoidable,"'- and furthermore, that this was the first case
before the Court "where the applicable Federal Rule was in direct
collision with the law of the relevant state."52 The Court's observation that Hanna was the first case involving a "direct collision"
seems to indicate the Court's reluctance to give a broad interpretation to the federal rules if such an interpretation would result in
displacement of a state right which at least is arguably substantive.5s Nevertheless, in future cases a court should first declare that
it has determined that there is such a direct collision before ruling
on whether the state law should be displaced. 4
Although the Court has demonstrated reluctance to broaden
the scope of a federal rule when it conflicts with a state substantive law, this should not be construed to mean that the
language of the state law must directly conflict with one of the
federal rules before the state law will be superseded. The language
of the Massachusetts statute involved in Hanna did not explicitly
conflict with that of Federal Rule 4 (d) ; however, the Court found
a direct conflict of "unmistakeable clarity"r, which warranted displacement of the state law. Furthermore, the language of the state
380 U.S. at 472.
51 Id.at 470.
52 Id. at 472.
58
Some may disagree with this statement. However, the tenor of the Court's
opinion in Hanna is one of reluctance; reluctance to displace a state law as is
evidenced by such words as "unavoidable," "unmistakeable" and "direct collision." Although the Court seems reluctant to seek out conflicting state laws,
this does not mean it will be reluctant to displace state laws when they are
in "direct collision" with a federal rule.
54 See Hardy v. Green, 277 F. Supp. 958 (D. Mass. 1967). There initially appears to be a 'direct collision" in Hardy, but Judge Julian declares "there is
thus no conflict here" between differing methods of service under the Federal
Rules and state law and no necessity for applying a Federal Rule in lieu of a
conflicting state rule." Id. at 960.
5 380 U.S. at 470.
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law involved, particularly if it is statutory, may be of significance
as was demonstrated in the examination of the Court's intricate
distinction between the Massachusetts statute involved in Hanna
and the Kansas statute involved in Ragan.
A final factor to be considered is the purpose of both the
state law and the federal rule. In Hanna the purpose of the "in
hand service" portion of the relevant statute was to insure that
executors would receive actual notice of claims against the estate
so they would not be subjected later to personal liability. 6 In any
traditional or common sense analysis this seems to be a "substantive" purpose.
The basically substantive purpose of the Massachusetts statute
was never disputed by Chief Justice Warren, who believed that the
statute's purpose-be it substantive or procedural-could be sufficiently achieved by use of Federal Rule 4 (d) (1) .1 The use of
the federal rule's method of service in lieu of the state's method is
in effect only a substitution of the mode of achieving the state's
substantive purpose rather than a frustration of the purpose itself.
Consequently, the holding in Hanna limits displacement of the
state's method of attaining its substantive purpose to instances
where that purpose is not an integral part of the mode of its enforcement. The determination of whether the state law's purpose
is inseparably linked with its mode of enforcement is primarily
dependant on whether the law's purpose can be attained through
a federal procedure at variance with the state mode of enforcement. To the extent that Hanna directs federal courts to apply
their procedure to achieve state purposes, it is "old wine in new
wineskin."' 8
Unfortunately, the narrow holding of Hanna is overshadowed
by some of its rather sweeping language. The statement that Congress can "prescribe housekeeping rules for federal courts," when
coupled with the prima facie procedural characteristic attached to
the federal rules, makes their integrity appear absolute. The
56 ld. at 462 n.1.
57 Id.

58 Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 356 US. 525 (1958).
'[T he requirement appears to be nearly a form and mode of enforcing the
immunity... and not a rule intended to be bound up with the definition of
the rights and obligations of the parties." Id. at 536 (emphasis added).
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). "When... a right Is enforceable in a federal as well as in a State court, the forms and mode of enforcing the right may at times .

.

. vary .

.

. But .

.

. a federal court cannot

afford recovery if the right to recover is made unavailable by the State ....
Id. at 108-09 (emphasis added).
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threatened effect of such language is that the lower federal courts

will seize upon it when a federal rule regates not only the state
mode of enforcing a state-created right but also the right itself,
and view the displacement of the state right as a natural consequence of its improvident interference with federal housekeeping.
The limited holding of Hanna is also overshadowed by what

Justice Harlan terms the Court's "misconceived ... constitutional
premises of Erie . . . ." The Court considers the "importance of
a state rule"-which is to say the purpose of the state law-to be of
limited relevance.

The importance of a state rule is indeed relevant,
but only in the context of asking whether application
of the rule would make so important a difference to the
character or result of the litigation that failure to enforce
it would unfairly discriminate against citizens of the
forum State, or whether application of the rule would
have so important an effect upon the fortunes of one or
both of the litigants that failure to enforce it would be
likely to cause a plaintiff to choose the federal court.00
The relevance of the state law's purpose is thus limited to its
effect on what the Chief Justice denotes as "the twin aims of the
Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of
inequitable administration of the laws."' 1 By so limiting the relevance of the "importance" or "purpose" of the state law, there is
a substantial threat in federal courts of an abrogation of various
private rights. It is for this reason that Justice Harlan decries the
Court's language suggesting that a federal rule should "apply no
matter how seriously it frustrated a State's substantive regulation
of the primary conduct and affairs of its citizens" '8 2 as long as the
application of the federal rule would not thwart the "twin aims
of Erie."
The marked tendency of the Court to freely frustrate various
state policies by implementing a mechanistic rule creates a definite
imbalance in favor of the federal rules. A more rational approach,
as suggested by Justice Harlan, would be to balance the state policy
against the federal policy in cases where the federal rule could
not merely obtain the state's purpose by a different means. Generally, the federal interest involved will be promotion of a uniform and
50 380 U.S. at 474.
60 Id. at 468 n.9.
61 Id.at 468.
62 Id.at 476.
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certain system of federal procedure, whereas the state interest will
probably vary with each law that comes into conflict with a federal
rule. Rather than apply the Court's mechanistic rule, the federal
courts should attempt to balance the interests of each sovereign in
order to determine which policy should be implemented. Total
disregard of the state policy or purpose involved will only serve
to imflame the rivalry between the state and federal judiciaries.
It must be emphasized that if the federal rule can achieve the
policy behind the state law by merely altering the mode of effecting
that policy, then the federal courts will only be substituting federal procedure for state procedure. On the other hand, when a state
procedural mode of enforcing a state-created right is bound up
with the right itself, and thus falls into the uncertain area between
substance and procedure, then the federal courts should make a
determined effort to ascertain which of the two conflicting policies
should prevail.
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